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Knott and Evans: The Third Reich at War
BOOK REVIEWS

like “reform” and “transformation”
mean different things to different parties. Brannon never makes clear what he
means by his Holy Grail of “reform.”
Brannon sees in Vladimir Putin (and
the Dimitri Medvedev–Putin team) the
political leadership missing in the
1990s. He suggests that the military is
more likely to give its aggressive support and obedience to decisive nationalists who support military reform. This
may be both the good and the bad news
of this provocative study.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich at War. New
York: Penguin, 2009. 926pp. $40

This final volume of Richard Evans’s
trilogy on the Third Reich (the earlier
titles being The Coming of the Third
Reich, 2003, and The Third Reich in
Power, 1933–1939, 2005) is a disquieting masterpiece of scholarship. Although many of the events recounted
here will be familiar to most readers,
Evans accomplishes the seemingly impossible by merging both the high politics (if one can use that term in
describing Hitler’s Germany) with the
best in contemporary social history of
the Third Reich. This sordid story has
never been told so powerfully or from
so many different perspectives. The
voices of the victims, perpetrators, and
bystanders, along with those of the architects of the conquest and genocide,
are all heard in chilling detail.
Evans notes that Hitler’s Operation
T-4, his “euthanasia action” program,
directed against disabled, mentally ill,
and incurably sick Germans, laid the
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foundation for the more dramatic,
Europe-wide extermination programs. To relieve the sense of despair
that permeates this book, one
searches for heroes, but they are few
in number. The sporadic camp and
ghetto uprisings were clearly heroic,
as was the resistance by such tiny
groups as the “White Rose” movement. Although the Roman Catholic
bishop Clemens von Galen led the effort to halt the T-4 program, Evans
notes that the bishop was silent when
it came to the regime’s treatment of
Jews and Gypsies. Hitler learned a
valuable lesson from the T-4 episode:
limit the paper trail and speak in euphemisms when dealing with statesponsored extermination programs.
There was, of course, resistance to
Hitler among some members of the
officer corps, men whose sense of
honor led them to recoil from the
atrocities they witnessed in the war in
the East. Another group, composed of
theologians, lawyers, and some socialist politicians, known to the Gestapo
as the Kreisauer Kreis (Kreisau Circle), failed to merge with the military
resisters, thus further diminishing the
already long odds that Hitler could be
deposed.
Unfortunately, more often than not, ordinary Germans reveled in Hitler’s early
victories and seemed to endorse, or at
least tolerate, Hitler’s annihilation policies. The notion that ordinary Germans
were unaware of the atrocities committed in their name is laughable. For instance, in the fall of 1939 German
officers and enlisted men wrote home
of the incredible “dirt” and “filth” they
encountered among the “subhuman”
Poles; they began to exterminate parts
of the population within days of the
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invasion. The swiftness with which Germany implemented a scorched-earth
policy designed to eliminate all traces of
Polish society is truly breathtaking. Evans convincingly argues that the “final
solution” was well under way by the
time the notorious Wannsee Conference convened in January 1942.
Wannsee was merely an attempt to
eliminate bureaucratic infighting and
reinforce the authority of Hitler’s point
man, Reinhard Heydrich, for the
Holocaust.
Evans has written the kind of book to
which all scholars aspire. It is a volume
in which a lifetime of research and writing comes together in a powerful, and
at times moving, manner. It is a book
that is sure to become a classic.
STEPHEN KNOTT

Naval War College

Adams, John A. If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific
War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy.
Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2008. 472pp.
$34.95

It is said of Secretary of War Henry
Stimson that in World War II he “frequently seemed to retire from the realm
of logic into a dim religious world in
which Neptune was God, Mahan his
prophet, and the United States Navy
was the only true Church.” Now we can
judge the validity of that comment,
thanks to John Adams’s If Mahan Ran
the Great Pacific War. Adams grades
both the U.S. force and its opponent,
the Imperial Japanese Navy (another
service professing Mahanian orthodoxy), according to their respective adherence to the sacred text. The result is
a lively, interesting exercise in
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counterfactual history, one that deals
both with what occurred and what
might have occurred had the high commands of both navies been more true to
what one might call “the revealed
Word.”
Counterfactual history is suspect to
many historians, who feel they have
enough problems figuring out what actually happened, let alone considering
what could have happened. However,
the Strategy and Policy course at the
Naval War College thinks differently,
seeking a host of alternatives. Adams essentially agrees, possibly because he is a
business executive and not a professional historian; he has written this excellent book as an avocation (more
power to him). “War is too important
to be left to the generals,” said Clemenceau in World War I. History is too important to be left to historians, if they
will not write about counterfactual
contingencies.
My reservations about this book are
slight but do exist. Excuse my sacrilege,
but having taught for twenty years at
the U.S. Army Staff College, I cannot
help thinking that there might be occasions when Mahan’s precepts could be
insufficient. Take his well known injunction, “Don’t divide the fleet.”
Admiral William F. Halsey took this to
heart when he was in command of the
Third Fleet at the largest naval battle in
human history—Leyte Gulf, in late October 1944. As all readers of this journal
know, Halsey took his entire force with
him to chase down a decoy rather than
divide it and provide a blocking force of
battleships and escort carriers to prevent a Japanese exit from the San
Bernardino Strait. Since Mahan, presumably, cannot be wrong, the blame
must fall to Halsey, for not realizing
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